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ABSTRACT
Along with the Red and Blue Teams
commissioned by the NASA Administrator
in 1992, NASA's Associate Administrator
for Space Communications commissioned a
Blue Team to review the Office of Space
Communications (Code O) Core Program
and determine how the program could be
conducted faster, better, and cheaper.
Since there was no corresponding Red
Team for the Code O Blue Team, the Blue
Team assumed a Red Team independent
attitude and challenged the status quo,
including current work processes,
functional distinctions, interfaces, and
information flow, as well as traditional
management and system development
practices. The Blue Team's unconstrained,
non-parochial, and imaginative look at
NASA's space communications program
produced a simplified representation of the
space communications infrastructure that
transcends organizational and functional
boundaries, in addition to existing systems
and facilities. Further, the Blue Team
adapted the "faster, better, cheaper" charter
to be relevant to the multi-mission,
continuous nature of the space
communications program and to serve as a
gauge for improving customer services
concurrent with achieving more efficient
operations and infrastructure life cycle
economies. This simplified representation,
together with the adapted metrics, offers a
future view and process model for
reengineering NASA's space
communications to remain viable in a
constrained fiscal environment.
Code O remains firm in its commitment to
improve productivity, effectiveness, and
efficiency. In October 1992, the Associate
Administrator reconstituted the Blue Team
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as the Code O Success Team (COST) to
serve as a catalyst for change. In this
paper, the COST presents the chronicle and
significance of the simplified representation
and adapted metrics, and their application
during the FY 1993-1994 activities.
Key Words: Blue Teams, Complexity
Reduction, Economies of Scale, "Faster,
Better, Cheaper, ""Life Cycle Effectiveness,
Mission Operations, Operations Concepts,
Operations Technology, Process
Improvement, Reengineering, Reusability,
Reuse, Simplicity, Space Communications,
Systems Engineering
1. INTRODUCTION
In addition to but separate from the Red and
Blue Teams commissioned by the NASA
Administrator, NASA's Associate
Administrator for Space Communications
commissioned a Blue Team to review the
Office of Space Communications (Code O)
core program and advise, within six weeks,
how the program could be conducted
faster, better, and cheaper. With no
corresponding Red Team for the Code O
Blue Team, the Blue Team was empowered
to take an unconstrained, non-parochial,
and imaginative look at the program and to
explore strategic options for change. The
Blue Team met during June-July 1992 and
filed its report on July 15, 1992. The
report contained findings,
recommendations, and initiatives in three
areas: (1) People, (2) Technical, and (3)
Financial. (Hornstein et al., 1993)
At the heart of the technical initiative is a
simplified representation and
characterization of the space
communications infrastructure that
transcends organizational and functional
boundaries, as well as existing systems and
facilities. This simplified representation
results from the Blue Team's discovery that
the numerous and seemingly diverse
infrastructure systems and facilities can be
represented by only two functional
categories.
These categories are (1) Information
Handling and (2) Resource
Management and Control. Information
Handling is the universe of activities
associated with data/information receipt,
processing (RF and digital), storage,
retrieval, formatting, distribution, and
transmission, including sensing of nominal
and fault conditions. Resource
Management and Control is the process of
making decisions about which resources
will be used for which activities at which
times; control of operations; and assuring
the allocation decisions are executed
properly through all life cycle phases,
including execution of recovery from
unplanned events and circumstances, to
satisfy operations goals and objectives.
The fulcrum of the simplified representation
is the set of "faster, better, cheaper" metrics
as adapted to fit the multi-mission,
continuous nature of the space
communications program. The non-
conventional adapted metrics are realistic,
credible, responsive ("faster and
cheaper"), simpler and smaller
("better") and are to be employed over both
customer and infrastructure life cycles,
rather than optimizing, for example, over
the development phase to constrain initial
development costs at the expense of the
operations and maintenance phase.
The technical initiative is designed to
reverse the trend of planning, designing,
developing, maintaining, and operating
costly one-of-a-kind systems and facilities.
The initiative, as submitted on July 15,
1992, reads as follows: Create, evaluate,
and select a wholly integrated operations
concept, leading to an end-to-end systems
architecture, with full participation of Code
O service providers and customers. The
concept _s to be applicable across
organizational and functional boundaries,
and not limited to the in place infrastructure
or configuration of existing systems and
facilities. The evaluation factors and
selection criteria will focus on customer
satisfaction, life cycle effectiveness, and the
adaptation of the ''faster, better, cheaper."
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The simplified space communications
representation and adapted metrics are
shown in Figure 1. In October 1992, the
Code O Blue Team was reconstituted as the
Code O Success Team (COST) to serve as
a catalyst for changing the process from
engineering systems to systems
engineering. The focus of this paper is on
laying the groundwork for process change,
promoting the teamwork to accomplish
change, and highlights of the FY 1993-
1994 activities.
i ?:_
!iii!ii"
!i!:i?(iii,
!!'!i!;j
?, !i ¸,
JL
ster,Chea ')
Figure - 1" Space Communications Representation and Metrics
2. LAYING THE GROUNDWORK
FOR INNOVATION
In less than six weeks during June-July
1992, the Code O Blue Team examined a
plethora of unique systems and facilities, all
engaged in providing space
communications services to space
communications customers, some of whom
are now labeled NASA Strategic
Enterprises. The systems and facilities
were unique in their names and titles,
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organizations and architectures, technical
components, and budget line items. To
facilitate the examination of what appeared
to be vastly distinct and divergent entities,
the Blue Team diagrammed the systems and
facilities to seek and formulate comparative
relationships. However, substantive
progress did not occur until the team
stopped scrutinizing how the systems and
facilities were engineered and started to
question their purpose(s). A simplified
representation of the space communications
infrastructure then began to emerge.
Through repeated examination of
similarities in purpose vice dtifferences in
engineering, the Blue Team was able to
group the space communications
infrastructure systems and facilities into
five functional categories at first, and
finally to collapse them into only two
functional categories: (1) Information
Handling and (2) Resource
Management and Control.
This discovery by the Blue Team (i.e., that
the numerous and seemingly diverse
infrastructure systems and facilities can be
represented by only two functional
categories) led to the recognition that there
are considerable economies of scale to be
gained and problems to overcome. We,
organizationally, have become shaped by
our emphasis on uniqueness. We tend to
engineer systems rather than conduct
systems engineering. This practice
produces locally optimized, narrowly
focused, and somewhat short-sighted
solutions that contribute to overall
infrastructure complexity through the
accumulation of these many special
solutions for similar purposes. Our
heritage of unique solutions (i.e., systems
and facilities) has fragmented our
perspective and created barriers. One
clearly visible barrier is language or
vocabulary. Heretofore, when defining
requirements for space communications
services, the requirements have been
described in terms of an implemented, or to
be augmented, system or facility. This
approach tends to limit the field of potential
and available solution sets, and continues to
perpetuate the proliferation of unique
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solutions. This entrenchment is adversely
impacting mission operations through
ineffective analysis of trade space
alternatives. This entrenchment is not
restricted to the space communications
program, but occurs throughout NASA's
strategic enterprises and functions.
A second key Blue Team finding or 'eureka'
deals with the adaptation of the "'faster,
better, cheaper" charter to reflect the multi-
mission, continuous nature of the space
communications program. Further, this
adaptation may be used to guide the
improvement of customer services while
accomplishing more efficient operations and
infrastructure life cycle economies. The
derivation of realistic, credible,
responsive, simpler and smaller from
"faster, better, cheaper" is as follows: The
Blue Team began its examination with
"faster" and "cheaper." Both concepts
seemed obvious, i.e., do whatever in less
time and with less money. Without giving it
a second thought, 'doing whatever in less
time' was related to accelerating system
delivery schedules or receiving data more
rapidly at higher rates. On second thought,
"faster" was less obvious. "Faster" was
meaningful only in the context of being
responsive to customer needs. Delivering a
system capability two years prior to need
(e.g., launch or encounter) may not be
advantageous if the implementation of that
capability creates restrictions in current
operations or introduces additional costs in
maintaining and operating the capability.
"Cheaper" was looked at in terms of the
agency flight program model and the multi-
mission, continuous nature of an
infrastructure model. Using the flight
program model, costs are tracked, on a per
mission or spacecraft basis, from beginning
to end or womb to tomb. However, an
infrastructure (now labeled as strategic
functions in the NASA Strategic Plan) spans
multiple missions and spacecraft. Economies
are achieved by leveraging the needs of
multiple customers and accommodating these
needs through modifications to the
infrastructure. The Blue Team probed and
found that emphasis was placed on
engineering systems, on a mission by
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mission basis, with restrained and controlled
implementation costs. Although economies
were gained, the results were sub-optimal
when one considers that the majority of a
system's life cycle is spent in the maintenance
and operations phase, not in the design and
development phase. Investigating the
meaning of "better" proved to be both
enlightening and revealing. In the minds of
many good engineers, "better" readily
translates to more whiz bang, e.g., state of
the art, advanced technology, enhanced
performance, and inevitably more
complexity. However, complexity often
translates into cost and schedule risk
throughout a system's life cycle.
From these deliberations and non-
conventional exchanges of views, it became
evident that "faster, better, cheaper" was
being discussed in terms of their units of
measure. Traditional units of measure (i.e.,
time and dollars) were being used for 'faster"
and "cheaper," but non-traditional units of
measure (i.e., complexity and size) had
surfaced for "better." In all cases, value had
to be measured across life cycles, both
customers and service providers alike. Value
for ''faster and cheaper" became realistic,
credible, responsive. Value for "better"
became simpler and smaller.
The two Blue Team discoveries described in
this section -- (1) that the numerous and
seemingly diverse infrastructure systems and
facilities can be represented by only two
functional categories and (2) that '`faster,
better, cheaper" is more appropriately
portrayed as realistic, credible,
responsive, simpler and smaller,
across life cycles -- constitute a new working
paradigm for preparing and delivering space
communications services. This new
paradigm strongly suggests that we depart
from our legacy of engineering systems to
establish the practice of true systems
engineering. Additionally, it must be
acknowledged that focusing on similarities,
rather than on differences, expands the
solution set for achieving economies of scale,
while creating opportunities for reducing
infrastructure complexity.
1147
3. PROMOTING TEAMWORK
TO ACCOMPLISH CHANGE
FY 1993
In October 1992, the Code O Blue Team
was reconstituted as the Code O Success
Team (COST) to serve as a catalyst for
change. The COST role was further
clarified to include complementing line
management and fostering cooperation (not
competition) across the Code O Family. In
addition, the COST accepted the challenge
to include a tactical emphasis in its planning
and to maintain a balance between this
tactical emphasis and the strategic (1)
People, (2) Technical, and (3) Financial
Blue Team initiatives. Consistent with this
clarified role, the COST set out to:
Promote cooperation and collaboration
across traditional boundaries
Nurture innovation by seeking ideas for
near term across-the-board
opportunities for savings
Advocate realistic, credible,
responsive, simpler and smaller
solutions
Actively solicit customer participation
Encourage use of the simplified space
communications representation and
adapted metrics in evaluating system
implementation projects
The COST entered into dialogues within the
Code O Family of service providers and
customers at Headquarters and the field
centers. These dialogues disclosed that
many of us were in violent agreement on
the need to change. While we recognized
that we shared a heritage of success, we
also acknowledged that the challenge was
to reduce the cost of success. This
challenge, "to reduce the cost of success"
became the hallmark of the FY 1993
activities.
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The FY 1993 activities included strategic
and tactical elements. Formulation of the
Code O Family vision was a strategic
endeavor to integrate the simplified space
communications representation, the adapted
metrics, the Blue Team initiatives, and the
challenge "to reduce the cost of success."
The one-page statement and illustration was
signed by the Associate Administrator for
Space Communications in June 1993. The
Code O Family vision statement is to
reduce the cost of success through (1)
increased cooperation, (2) improved se_wice
to and partnership with customers, and (3)
decreased cost and complexity of the space
communications infrastructure.
Two tactical activities were conducted
during FY 1993. They centered on
remaining viable in a constrained fiscal
environment, while pursuing the vision.
The COST organized and hosted the first
Space Communications Programmatic and
Tactical Planning Workshop. Attendees
included space communications service
providers and their customers. There were
two key objectives:
Develop a technical foundation and
teamwork base to facilitate work on
operations concepts
Develop an investment strategy that
included areas for near term savings
The workshop teams presented their results
and recommendations to Code O Senior
Management, including the Associate
Administrator. The recommendations were
synthesized into six areas for tactical
savings and incorporated in the budget
guidelines. In retrospect, the workshop set
the stage for teaming across organizational
boundaries and for testing the value of
proposed infrastructure modifications in
terms of customer benefit.
Also incorporated in the budget guidelines,
was the announcement of the Code O
Investment Program. This program
provided an open channel for the field
centers to submit proposals that reduced
costs, improved services to customers, or
otherwise contributed to making the Code
O infrastructure of systems and operational
services simpler, cheaper, or more
customer friendly. The proposal selection
criteria were based on (1) Contribution to
the Code O Family vision and (2) Rapid
Investment Payback - within three years.
The Code O Investment Program was
intended to build on the teaming started at
the workshop and create near term across-
the-board opportunities for savings. In
retrospect, it was difficult to shed local
institutional perspectives. Only ten tactical
winners were selected from sixty-three
proposal abstracts and twenty full
proposals.
4. REDUCING
THE COST OF SUCCESS FOR
NASA's MISSION OPERATIONS
FY 1994
Early in the year, the COST determined that
going after strategic and tactical results
concurrently was not leading to the desired
state. Line management was proceeding
with business as usual, i.e., working
within organizational boundaries and
motivating their employees to do the same.
Meanwhile, circumstances had overtaken
the tactical program.
Process changes to realize substantive
economies of scale would have to be
strategic, and technical innovation to reduce
cost and complexity would have to be
strategically motivated. Further, "reducing
the cost of success" actually meant reducing
the cost of success for mission operations
for NASA's strategic enterprises and
strategic functions. With active and intense
involvement by the Associate Administrator
for Space Communications, the COST role
was broadened to encompass agency
mission operations.
The COST organized and hosted a mission
operations workshop. Participants were a
non-parochial cross section of mission
operations experience from NASA, industry,
academia, and another government
organization. They had been selected using
the same criteria used to select members of
the initial Code O Blue Team:
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Independent Thinkers, yet Team Players
Recognized for Technical Expertise and
Professional Integrity
Prepared to Challenge the Status Quo
Able to Resist Engineering the Solution
Before Understanding the Problem
Experience in engineering systems and
Systems Engineering; able to distinguish
Willing to be Unconstrained, Non-
parochial, and Imaginative
Empowered to Explore Strategic Options
rather than Producing a Quick Fix
Perseverance and Commitment Post-
Workshop (l-year continued tezuning)
The workshop theme was NASA Teaming
Across Organizational Boundaries to Reduce
the Cost of Success for End-to-End Mission
Operations. The workshop goal was to
expressly begin work on changing the culture
to stimulate innovation and promote
cooperation and collaboration across
traditional boundaries for the good of NASA.
The workshop was to be considered as the
kick-off meeting for building relationships
and creating teaming an'angements to step up
to the challenge of reducing life cycle costs
for NASA mission operations. The principal
workshop objective was to articulate a
common baseline for services and functions
necessary to conduct end-to-end mission
operations. In order to emphasize similarities
in purpose vice differences in engineering,
the descriptions of these services and
functions were to be independent of existing
systems, facilities, technologies,
organizations, and personalities.
The workshop announcement stated that
many of us believe the big payoff will come
from reversing the trend of engineering
special solutions for similar problems,
through the identification, development, and
deployment of reusable components that
simplify engineering (building and
maintaining) and operating systems for end-
to-end mission operations. Achieving an
agreed to baseline of services and functions
was seen as a mandatory first step on the
road to payoff.
The opening session of the workshop was a
dialogue between the participants and the
NASA Administrator. His presence
reinforced the priority of cooperating and
collaborating across organizational
boundaries, At the conclusion of the session,
he invited workshop representatives to
continue the dialogue at the next Senior
Management Meeting to be held June 9,
1994. The invitation was accepted.
Preparation for the Senior Management
Meeting energized the representatives to form
a non-standard alliance of Code O Success
Team/Lifecycle Effectiveness for Strategic
Success (COST LESS) for Mission
Operations. This alliance established the
following goals, technical approach, and
people process:
Goals
Redefine Success in a Constrained Fiscal
Environment
Reduce the Cost of Success for End-to-End
Mission Operations
Technical Approach
Reverse the Trend of Engineering Special
Solutions for Similar Problems
People Process
Break Down Barriers and Team Across
Traditional Boundaries
The alliance presented to NASA Senior
Management that the goals would be met, and
significant savings could be realized by
improving processes and incorporating them
into the line organizations. The COST LESS
for Mission Operations alliance also reported
that "across traditional boundaries" included
life cycles, functions, programs and projects,
as well as organizations. The effort
envisioned would be multi-dimensional and
multi-disciplinary in order to achieve example
U •
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resultssuchas(1) CommonVocabulary,(2)
ReusableSolutionsto Simplify Engineering
andOperations,and(3)OperationsConcepts
toMaximizeValue.
5. NEXT STEPS FOR FY 1995
In the NASA Senior Management Meeting of
June 9, 1994, the Administrator noted that
the key to success is the cross-cutting nature
of the COST LESS team for Mission
Operations. It allowed the group to review
NASA objectively versus as individual
organizations. With this endorsement, the
team is reconvening during August-
September 1994 to prepare for the next steps
between NASA's strategic enterprises and
functions.
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